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bstract: This paper examines whether
or not children’s continued electoral
exclusion is morally defensible.
 Ultimately, there is a deep tension between the
egalitarian presuppositions of democracy and
our apparent unwillingness to grant children
voting rights. Unless a plausible distinction can
be found, then, between adults and children
that also tracks the underlying reasons for
 endorsing democracy in the first place, the
 continued political disenfranchisement of our
youngest citizens is shown for what it is: social
injustice. The paper begins by exploring some
of the conceptual diﬃculties that childhood
creates in relation to democracy. It then assesses
the implications of two very diﬀerent
 approaches to democracy for children’s voting
rights: proceduralism and a child’s supposed
right to an open future.
Introduction
At first glance, the idea that children should
have voting rights probably strikes most
people - if they ever contemplate it at all - as
an absurdity. One need not be a pediatrician
or psychologist (or, parent, for that matter)
to appreciate the fact that, especially when
they are very young, children are often
 emotionally unstable, ethically immature,
and cognitively under-developed and, thus,
typically ill-equipped for discharging the
rights and responsibilities of democratic
 citizenship. However, the continued exclu-
sion of children from the electoral franchise
sits rather uneasily with both influential
 philosophical defences of democracy and the
existing electoral practices of Western
 liberal-democratic states. What makes
 democracy ethically attractive as a political
form is that all citizens are to share equally in
shaping the law and public policy that sets
out the basic framework of rights and
 responsibilities that determine, or at least
greatly influence, their life prospects and
 opportunities. A democracy is better than its
rivals, so the argument goes, because it  treats
its citizens with equal concern and respect.
But children are citizens too, so why are they
denied what is probably the single most im-
portant democratic right - the right to vote?
Furthermore, why isn’t that denial a straight-
forward violation of the equality that demo-
cracy is supposed to deliver? As we shall see,
one answer is based upon children’s mani-
fest disabilities in relation to whatever capa-
bility benchmark is used to identify the legal
age of majority. This move will not do,
 however, at least without further argument,
because, beyond the legal age of majority,
disabilities of those kinds typically do not
disqualify adults above the threshold. In
 Canada, for example, neither the insane nor
convicted criminals are barred from voting.
In short, the common intuition about the
absurdity of granting voting rights to chil-
dren is, in fact, quite hard to sustain in light
of both the best arguments for democracy
and existing electoral practices.
This paper explores some of the complexi-
ties surrounding this tension between the
common intuition, on the one hand, and
the arguments for democracy and existing
practices, on the other. It begins by motivat -
ing the topic by showing how, in general,
children’s political disenfranchisement raises
serious questions of justice that must be
 addressed rather than ignored. If we are to
continue excluding children from the
 franchise, that exclusion, itself, should be
based upon a defensible political morality
 rather than simply the result of unquestioned
convention or habit. The rest of the paper
takes up this challenge by exploring two very
diﬀerent approaches to democracy to see
what they yield in connection with children’s
voting rights. If the core idea of democracy
is the collective authorization of laws by
 voting for them, broadly speaking, there are
two ways of defending that idea: first, as a
fair procedure for adjudicating the compet -
ing preferences and interests of citizens, each
of whom are assumed to be equally worthy
of political concern and respect; and,
 second, as the implication of a character
ideal rooted in the value of personal auto-
nomy. This paper examines the implications
of proceduralism for children’s voting rights
via David Estlund’s most recent contribu-
tion to normative democratic theory.1 In
Estlund’s hands, the justification of demo-
cracy crucially depends upon the refutation
of ‘epistocracy’ - the rule of the wise.2 Like so
many others, Estlund deliberately chooses to
omit children from the purview of his ana-
lysis. However, his arguments bear directly
upon the question of children’s voting rights,
because the case for excluding children from
the franchise normally rests explicitly upon
the premise that political authority should
be knowledge-based, and it is this premise
that Estlund attacks. Thus, if the critique of
epistocracy succeeds, this might supply
 advocates of children’s voting rights with
much-needed theoretical support. Because
the ideal of personal autonomy has played
such an important role in recent moral and
political philosophy, this paper considers
what (if anything) is implied by a child’s
right to an ‘open future’ in connection with
voting rights.3
What is a child?
From the moral point of view, what could
be worrisome about the electoral disenfran-
chisement of children? Up until fairly re-
cently, at least, children have not been
central figures in ethical analyses of politics
so the question was unlikely to arise in the
first place.4 But in the West, now, after
 several hundred years of democratic theory
and practice, there are prima facie tensions,
perhaps even contradictions, between the
most influential justifications of majority
rule and our continued unwillingness to give
the vote to anyone younger than, say, 18
years of age.5
I have repeatedly referred to ‘children’. What,
then, is a ‘child’? Our modern  conception of
childhood is parasitic on that of adulthood,
to the extent that children are often charac-
terized primarily as lacking what defines an
adult.6 In most philosophical accounts, chil-
dren’s relative capacity impoverishment is
pervasive, deep and multi-perspectival. For
instance, Archard states: “These include the
moral or juridical perspective from which
persons may be judged incapable, in virtue
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of age, of being responsible for their deeds;
an epistemological or metaphysical viewpoint
from which persons, in view of their imma-
turity, are seen as lacking in adult reason or
knowledge; and a political angle from which
young humans are thought unable to
 contribute towards and participate in the
running of the community.”7
Analytically, then, a concept of childhood
requires that children be somehow distin-
guish able from adults in light of some un-
specified set of attributes; a conception of
childhood is a specification of those attributes.
In the contemporary Western world, a
 widespread, perhaps dominant, conception
of adulthood (and therefore also of child-
hood) goes something like this: an adult is
someone who is rational, physically inde-
pendent, autonomous, and with a sense of
identity that derives partly from critical
 reflection upon her beliefs and desires.
 Because of this, she can make free and
 informed choices for which she can / should
be held responsible. It is because a child lacks
these dispositions and capacities that she is
thought unable to, say, work for a living, be
legally accountable for her actions, or vote.
A structural problem confronts any concep -
t ion that indexes childhood to adulthood in
the way that Western culture seems to.8 To
be at all plausible, a psychological account
of human development, or an epistemologi-
cal account of the acquisition of knowledge
will have to be gradual. As Locke sought to
demonstrate, barring social or natural
 catastrophes, humans acquire reason gra-
dually, so the transition from childhood into
adulthood is typically both continuous and
cumulative.9 But legal rights and responsi-
bilities, including voting rights, would seem
to be all or nothing - either one has the right
to vote, or one does not. As Archard astutely
points out, this creates the problem “of how
to dovetail a psychological account of human
development, or an epistemological account
of the acquisition of knowledge, with the
establishment of criteria whose possession
guarantees a certain moral, political and ju-
ridical status”.10
Some critics have found the problem to be
insoluble, such that any attempt to draw
legal distinctions between children and
adults on the basis of supposed age / com-
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petence correlations alone is inherently un-
fair.11 Clearly, there is something inherently
arbitrary and therefore unfair about drawing
legal distinctions on the basis of age alone.
To discriminate against the young because
they are young is as bad, morally speaking, as
discriminating against, say, blacks or women
because of the colour of their skin, or their
sex, respectively. That kind of ageism, as it is
now called, is indeed reprehensible. But
there is nothing necessarily objectionable
about using age as a reliable proxy for  various
competences that might be relevant to
people’s abilities to eﬀectively discharge
rights and responsibilities.12 Ultimately, the
real questions are whether or not the proxy
of age reliably tracks (in a probabilistic
sense) the competences that are supposed to
be relevant, whether or not those compe-
tences really are relevant, and, finally, whet-
her a possession of them is fairly demanded
of everyone or, instead, tested for or, even
worse, assumed, only selectively. 
For argument’s sake, then, let us divide
childhood into the following subcategories:
infancy (birth-6 years), childhood proper (6-
12 years), and young personhood (12-18
years).13 With this framework in mind, we
should ask: is there a compelling basis for ex-
cluding children from the franchise, one that
will not also lead to the exclusion of some
(perhaps many) adults, or to giving some
adults plural votes? In sum, is their exclusion
consistently defensible in light of the best ar-
guments for democracy?
Is there a problem with children’s politi-
cal disenfranchisement?
The core idea of democracy is the collective
authorization of laws by the people who are
subject to them. As such, democracy is
 inseparable from voting.
Symbolically, voting rights are the mark of
democratic citizenship. Citizens are those
who participate in the government of their
society; they do so either by voting on laws
directly, or by electing representatives to do
so on their behalf. In the voluminous litera-
ture on democratic theory, there are many
diﬀerent explanations as to why voting has
the normative significance that democrats
allege, that is, why casting a ballot legitima-
tes the results and makes them binding and
authoritative on everyone, even on political
losers. 
Here are two promising candidates. First,
democracy is implied by a principle of basic
equality. At least among adults, “no persons
are so definitely better qualified than others
to govern that they should be entrusted with
complete and final authority over the
 government of the state”.14 On this view,
majority rule follows from the assumption
that a legitimate government must give
equal consideration to the good and interests
of every person bound by its decisions.
 Second, democracy is a fair procedure for
translating individual preferences into social
choices when people disagree. Any other
 social choice mechanism will either antece-
dently assume that some people’s interests
count for more than those of others (violat -
ing equality) or it will incorporate some con-
troversial pre-political standard of right and
wrong that people’s votes should track  (making
voting dispensable). This violates equality and
ignores pluralism.15 Both  strategies are fraught
with diﬃculties when it comes to denying
children - certainly older teenagers - voting
rights. The egalitarian argument invokes the
interests of every person but proceeds, on the
basis of that  premise, to limit the franchise
to every adult citizen. As critics have pointed
out, this slide, while characteristic, typically
occasions little notice.16 But sound argu-
ments are required to justify denying chil-
dren the vote, particularly when the unequal
voting power of the elderly relative to the
young leads (predictably) to the latter
group’s heightened liability to poverty and
all of its associated horrors. The procedural
argument can  exclude children tout court
only by assuming that, as a group, they lack
the capacity to make rational decisions
about alternative parties and their policies in
light of whatever information is available
about them. Do they? Of course, this is an
empirical, not a philosophical, question, but
we can’t begin to answer it without doing
philosophical legwork first, because precisely
which capacities are required will depend
upon how  democracy is interpreted - its
point, value and purpose. We cannot know
whether or not their relative capability defi-
cits should disqualify children from voting
until we know which capabilities ground vo-
ting rights. And we cannot know what those
 capabilities are, in turn, without closely
 examining leading accounts of democracy.
Shortly, we turn to procedural and substan-
tive accounts of democracy shortly to see
whether, in fact, children may be justifiably
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excluded on the basis of their relative capa-
bility deficits. For now, we can say at least
this much: in order for children’s continued
political disenfranchisement not to require
justification, the following three highly
 dubious things would have to be true:
(1) Children have no distinctive interests of 
their own;
(2) Even if they do have such distinctive  
interests, their parents can adequately 
represent them at the polling booth;
(3) The costs of disenfranchisement are 
borne by all children, not simply by the 
poor and powerless.17
As Schrag points out, the most obvious chil-
dren’s interest that is not shared by adults is
the interest in receiving an adequate educa-
tion, one that potentially conflicts with
 interests in maximally high after-tax paren-
tal incomes. Even if children’s interests could
be fully represented by their parents, how -
ever, such representation will hardly be
equally influential or eﬀective, given existing
levels of socio-economic inequality, and this
seems to violate the procedural fairness that
many democratic accounts champion.
 Finally, because parents from diﬀerent social
classes are not equally likely to vote, children
of the most vulnerable will remain the least
eﬀectively represented, even if we assume
that children’s interests are best represented
by their own parents. In the end, if we want
to continue to deny children the vote, we
will have to confront questions that our
 political ancestors have ignored, that is, their
exclusion must be justified rather than
 simply assumed. Can it be?
Democracy, Plato’s shadow and the rule
of the wise
Western political theory begins with the
 suggestion that democracy is not naturally
plausible because it hands over political
 decision-making to those too stupid to be
entrusted with power.18 Today, and at least
openly, this is almost universally denied, but
the conclusion is surprisingly hard to resist.
After all, when it comes to life and death
medical decisions, for example, could there
be anything more moronic than holding a
vote instead of relying on a doctor’s exper-
tise? Surely, the stakes in political decisions
are sometimes equally high, involving as
they do national security, warfare, the admin -
istration of criminal justice, the provision of
essential educational and social services, and
so on. If the ancient medical/political
 analogy is apt, we seem to have the basis for
an anti-democratic argument with the
 following general structure:
(1) There are true (procedure-independent) 
normative standards by which political 
decisions ought to be judged;
(2) Some (relatively few) people know those 
normative standards better than others; 
therefore
(3) The normative political knowledge of 
the relative few is a warrant for their 
having political authority over the rest.19
Call this the argument for ‘epistocracy’, or
rule by the knowledgeable.20 Let us ignore
the separate and admittedly diﬃcult issue as
to the precise content of the relevant
knowledge and the education responsible for
producing it. Assume that such knowledge
exists and also that people with that educa-
tion will tend to rule more wisely than those
without it.21 Both seem like fairly minimal
assumptions and, if we concede them, we
 finally have a promising basis for justifiably
excluding children from the franchise be-
cause, along with the majority of adults, they
lack the expertise of the politically wise.22
Given our purposes, then, it is worth
 pondering whether or not the argument for
epistocracy succeeds.
Premise (1) looks unassailable and child
 liberationists, in particular, are certainly in
no position to reject it to the extent that
their demand for children’s political inclu-
sion itself is advanced as a true requirement
of political morality. Premise (2) might
 render the argument tautological, but only if
we identify the content of the requisite
 political education as whatever happens to
lead the relative few to rule more wisely. If
there is a way of giving content to that
 education such that, contingently, people
with it will tend to rule more wisely, then
(3) seems to follow from (2), and democracy
is a non-starter along with children’s voting
rights, because it is certainly reasonable to
think that children, especially the very
young, will in all likelihood lack the relevant
knowledge that grounds political authority.
How to reject epistocracy
Perhaps this is too quick, though. Even if we
concede (1) and (2) - and we probably should
- the inference from (2) to (3) commits the
‘expert/boss fallacy’ by illicitly assuming that
because someone would rule better they are
pro tanto a legitimate or authoritative ruler.23
David Estlund makes the point as follows:
“It is important to see that authority does
not simply follow from expertise. Even if we
grant that there are better and worse politi-
cal decisions (which I think we must), and
that some people know better what should
be done than others (we all think some are
much worse than others), it simply does not
follow from their expertise that they have
authority over us, or that they ought to. This
expert/boss fallacy is tempting, but some -
one’s knowledge about what should be done
leaves completely open what should be done
about who is to rule. You might be correct,
but what makes you boss?”24
Like so many other contemporary defenders
of liberal-democracy, Estlund invokes a
 principle of political legitimacy in which state
power must be publicly justified, that is,
 reasonably agreed to by everyone subjected to
it.25 It is this justificatory standard that rules
out epistocracy: the inference from (2) to (3)
above would be reasonably rejected by free
and equal citizens unwilling to irrevocably
surrender power to putative political experts.
The kind of pluralism - cultural, religious,
ethical, metaphysical - likely to survive and
thrive under free institutions is not conducive
to generating a normative consensus that
would identify the relevant experts.26
Estlund highlights the expert / boss fallacy
in order to block epistemic justifications of
plural voting systems, that is, of systems that
grant more votes to those better qualified
(because better educated) to rule.27 He
 chooses to ignore children, but the omission
is rather curious in this context. The reason -
able rejection standard of political legitimacy
that he deploys to vindicate egalitarian
 democracy by blocking the inference from
(2) to (3) seems to cut both ways. On Est-
lund’s view, all adults are to have the same
voting rights despite their being diﬀerentially
endowed with political wisdom because such
wisdom is not the basis of justified author ity.
Fine, but why should we deprive children of
the vote on the basis of their relative
 epistem ic deficits when similar deficits are
not grounds for excluding adults? The argu-
ment that vindicates egalitarian democracy
from Plato’s elitist shadow also casts serious
doubt on the continued exclusion of chil-
dren from the franchise.
One way for proceduralists to resist this
 conclusion would be to identify a threshold
level of competence below which children
are thought to fall. On this satisficing con-
ception, voting rights require people to have
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enough of whatever composite of abilities is
relevant to collective self-rule but, over and
above that amount, diﬀerential abilities
would not translate into unequal entitle-
ments. If the legal age of majority is actually
a reliable proxy for that composite, then pro-
cedural accounts of democracy may, in the
end, justifiably exclude children from the
franchise. Lacking the requisite knowledge
and abilities, children would not count
among those whose reasonable  consent was
required to justify state power. Subjected to
parental authority, they would be as Locke
described them - gradually on the way to ac-
quiring freedom (including  political free-
dom) as they developed over time into
competent reasoners.28
So the central question is this: are children
unreasonable? Before rushing to the conclu-
sion that they most certainly are, there are
several things to keep in mind. Some of the
children currently below the legal age of ma-
jority in Canada (18) are ‘young persons’, as
I’m calling them, between 12-18 years of
age. Many of these children are probably
more computer literate, news savvy and
 politically sophisticated than their parents,
and in a way that makes it likely that they
possess basic abilities to understand and
 rationally evaluate alternative parties and
 policies. This seems like a prima facie reason
to lower the voting age to somewhere
around 15, perhaps even lower.29 In any
event, rationality - the ability to relate ends
to means in logically consistent and coherent
fashion - is not critical to the proceduralist’s
standard of political legitimacy. Failing to be
rational in that sense will certainly impugn
a person’s capacity to be autonomous, that
is, to live a partly self-chosen life that’s
 reflective of one’s fundamental values and
commitments. We examine the connection
between personal and political autonomy
later in connection with a child’s supposed
right to an open future. But personal auto-
nomy, itself, is a contested value about
which reasonable people will disagree.30
A child’s right to an open future?
For some political philosophers, the central
task of governments is to help people lead
decent, or ethically valuable, lives.31 Today,
such lives are often characterized as person -
ally autonomous ones.32 Suppose, then, that
children have a moral ‘right to an open
 future’33, one in which they, rather than their
parents, are to choose the ethical ideals that
guide their lives.34 Distinguishing between
autonomy as a substantive character ideal
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and autonomy as a set of capacities for criti-
cal self-reflection, we could then say, and on
the basis of that supposed right, that parents
have positive duties to foster, and negative
duties not to harm, those capacities. In
 attributing fairly sophisticated autonomy
rights to children, admittedly many of
whom are not yet capable of exercising
them, we are not making a fundamental
 category mistake, as some critics allege.35
 Instead, we are only ruling out kinds of
 violating parental conduct now that will
 guarantee, or at least make it significantly
more likely, that important options for chil-
dren are foreclosed later. So the kind of
 autonomy that’s invoked here might be called
anticipatory: ”[a child’s] right while he is still
a child is to have these future options kept
open until he is a fully formed self- determining
adult capable of deciding among them“.36 
Does children’s political exclusion violate
their right to an open future? If so, this
would be problematic for both children and
democracy, because democratic institutions
are often defended precisely on the grounds
that, under them, personally autonomous
lives are likely to flourish.37There are several
reasons for thinking that children’s political
disenfranchisement might undermine their
interest in their having futures left
 suﬃciently open. To begin with, there is the
correlation I hinted at earlier between that
disenfranchisement and heightened levels of
poverty and its concomitant miseries. Since
the young are so disproportionately power-
less relative to the elderly, law and policy-
makers have very little incentive to take
young people’s interests and preferences se-
riously. As a result, they are neglected along
various dimensions - health, education, and
day care, for example - in ways that adversely
impact the range and quality of options
open to them later in life as adults, as well as
their capacities to assess and make use of
those options. Children’s anticipatory auto-
nomy is damaged by adults / parents  choos -
ing to fund education inadequately, thereby
damaging what might be called its internal
resources. There are many diﬀerent accounts
of personal autonomy and, therefore, many
diﬀerent ways of interpreting its anticipatory
dimensions. However, any plausible inter-
pretation will make personal autonomy a
composite of three distinct conditions:
 appropriate mental abilities, an adequate
range of options to choose from, and
 independence from outside manipulation
and coercion. Clearly, if a person is to be
partly the author of her own life by choos ing
and pursing projects - relationships, commit -
ments, goals - then she must possess a range
of cognitive skills. She will require, at mini-
mum, practical reasoning skills that enable
her to conceive of alternative options for
choice. Additionally, she must have the
mental abilities to form complex intentions
as well as the capacity to comprehend the
means required for the realization of her
goals. Such cognitive skills and mental
 abilities are clearly damaged by inadequately
funded, under-staﬀed and poorly managed
educational systems.
Children’s anticipatory autonomy is also
thwarted by adults / parents pre-committing
expenditures, thus damaging the material
means for its exercise. Alongside the cogni-
tive capacities necessary for project pursuit
and freedom from manipulation and coercion,
the final precondition of personal autonomy
is an adequate range of options for choice.
This adequacy criterion is satisfied primarily
through variety, and not number, of options.
Because choices are guided by reasons, the
options available for an autonomous indivi-
dual must diﬀer enough to rationally aﬀect
choice. To be suﬃcient for personal auto-
nomy, then, an option-set must contain: (1)
a plurality of options with (2) distinct
 opportunities that yield (3) significantly
 diﬀerent reasons for choice and, of these (4)
at least one and ideally several of them must
be thought of as worthwhile by the person
in question.38 When adults / parents pre-
commit public expenditures in ways that
unfairly shift fiscal burdens onto subsequent
generations, there is the worry that such
 generations will have their capacities for
 personal autonomy stunted via a diminished
and impoverished range of choices - social,
economic, cultural, recreational, artistic,
 aesthetic, and so on.
Children’s voting rights: addressing the
lingering worries
Granting children the vote is one way to
block uses of parental / political power that
foreclose the anticipatory autonomy of chil-
dren in these various ways. On the one
hand, there is an obvious flaw with this
 suggestion, namely, that while anticipatory
autonomy implicates future abilities, the
 eﬀective and intelligent use of voting rights
depends upon children’s present capacities to
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share in collective self-determination.39
There is something incoherent about grant -
ing ‘rights-in-trust’40 to people (children)
whose very capacities to exercise them are
developed by having their freedom pater -
nalistically limited now. On the other hand,
and within limits, children’s present incapa-
cities might, themselves, be partially related
to their political disenfranchisement. In On
Liberty, J.S Mill argues that: “The human
 faculties of perception, judgment, discrimi-
native feeling, mental activity, and even
moral preference, are exercised only in
 making a choice. He who does anything
 because it is the custom makes no choice.
He gains no practice either in discerning or
in desiring what is best. The mental and
moral, like the muscular powers, are improved
only by being used” [emphasis mine].41
If the capacities for eﬀective democratic par-
ticipation track those implicated in chil-
dren’s anticipatory autonomy, that is, if
being personally autonomous is, in some
sense, a constitutive part of what makes
 someone a good democratic citizen, then we
should not be too quick to point to chil-
dren’s relative disabilities to deny them
 voting rights which we currently grant to
adults.42 Why not? Because, if Mill is right,
some of those capacities will likely be deve-
loped and subsequently improved only by
regular use. Therefore, one familiar objection
can be turned on its head: we shouldn’t
 exclude children because they are incompe-
tent; we should include them so they
 become less so, and much sooner. Children
have to grow up; perhaps democracy should
too.
This conclusion also reveals a critical but un-
noticed flaw in recent proposals for the
 political enfranchisement of children via
proxy votes. Some philosophers argue that,
in order to instantiate genuinely universal
suﬀrage, parents should be granted plural
votes, for example, either one extra vote if
they have minors living with them, or one
extra vote for each minor in their house-
hold.43 The idea assumes that children’s
 interests are best represented by their parents
or whoever is rearing them, given the fairly
predictable workings of aﬀection and natu-
ral partiality. The standard objection is that,
unfortunately, we cannot count on parents
to eﬀectively represent their children’s inte-
rests.44 Because of a variety of factors -
 selfishness, shortsightedness, irrationality,
and ignorance, to mention but a few - they
often will not do so. But Mill reminds us of
a deeper worry, namely, that empowering
parents (or other indirect strategies for that
matter, including the guardianship propo-
sal) does nothing to address or rectify the
underlying cause of children’s exclusion in
the first place - their relative capability
 deficits. 
Conclusion
Where does all of this leave us? In connect -
ion with the franchise, a child’s right to an
open future leads to less decisive conclusions
than does the procedural understanding of
democracy. However, an appropriate solution
to the balance of considerations seems to
point in the direction of a gradualist com-
prise, not to a total rejection of the case for
lowering the age at which people are legally
entitled to vote. While there is not much to
be said in favour of politically empowering
young infants who are as likely to eat, rather
than mark, a ballot, we should do more than
we presently do to expedite and facilitate
children’s full inclusion into the political
process. Aside from encouraging various
forms of democratic participation at home
and in school, we should encourage children
to take a more active interest in the values,
processes and results of political decision-
making. Lowering the voting age would be
a good way of doing so. Nothing in this pro-
posal is oﬀensive to the proceduralist argu-
ment, because that argument does not
determine a particular age cut-oﬀ. It is also
consistent with the essentially evolving
 nature of childhood.45
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ment of these tensions and potential contra-
dictions, see Schrag 2004.
6. Schapiro 1999: For example, Schapiro
claims that childhood is essentially a predi-
cament that must be overcome before moral
responsibility can be ascribed to people. See
Archard 2004 for a very illuminating dis-
cussion of how Locke’s picture of children as
fledgling but imperfect reasoners is typical
of much contemporary philosophical wri-
ting on childhood.
7. Archard 2004: 32.
8. The contemporary Western conception
now insists upon a sharp distinction bet-
ween the behaviour demanded of children
and that expected of adults. There is now a
marked division of roles and responsibilities
that did not always obtain, or at least not ne-
arly so sharply. Other non-Western cultures
today also possess the concept of childhood,
recognizing as they do a diﬀerence between
children and adults, but ”they see children
diﬀering from adults in a far less dramatic
and obvious fashion than is implied by the
modern conception“, Archard 2004: 39.
9. Locke 1964.
10. Archard 2004: 12.
11. Farson 1974; Holt 1974.
12. Clayton 2006: 186.
13. Archard 2004: 65.
14. Dahl 1998: 79.
15. Lecce 2003; 2005; 2008a.
16. Schrag 2004.
17. Schrag 2004: 374.
18. Plato 1974: 206-212.
19. Estlund 1993/ 2008.
20. Estlund 2008: 30.
21. Estlund’s examples are the following:
”basic literacy, basic knowledge of how one’s
government works, some historical
knowledge, knowledge of some variety of ex-
tant ways of life in one’s society, some
knowledge of economics, some knowledge
of the legal rights and responsibilities of one-
self and others, basic knowledge of the con-
stitution of one’s political community, and
so forth“, Estlund 2008: 212.
22. Schumpeter 1976.
23. Estlund 2008: 40.
24. Estlund 2008: 3.
25. Barry 1995; Cohen 1997; Larmore
1987; Lecce 2008a; Nagel 1991; Rawls
1971; 1993; Scanlon 1998 and see Lecce
2008a for analyses of alternative formulati-
ons of the liberal principle of political legiti-
macy.
26. ”Even if some have knowledge, others
have no way of knowing this unless they can
know the same thing by independent
means, in which case they have no use for
the other’s expertise“, Estlund 1993: 84.
27. See Mill 1972 for a liberal justification
of plural voting.
28. Locke 1964.
29. See, for example, Wahlrecht ohne
 Altersgrenze? Verfassungsrechtliche, demokra-
tietheoretische und entwicklungspsychologische
Aspekte, Foundation for the Rights of Future
Generations 2007, for claims that the ap-
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propriate age should be 12.
30. Lecce 2008a.
31. Raz 1986.
32. Dworkin 1990; Feinberg 1980; Kym-
licka 1989; Raz 1986.
33. Feinberg 1980.
34. See Lecce 2008b for reasons to doubt
that they do have this right, at least as it is ty-
pically interpreted.
35. Onora O’Neill insists that the way for
children to overcome their dependence and
vulnerability is not to assert their rights but
to ‘grow up’. O’Neill 1989: 204.
36. Feinberg 1980: 126.
37. Dworkin 1990; Kymlicka 1989; Mill
1972.
38. Lecce 2008a: 106.
39. Tremmel 2006; Van Parijs 1999.
40. Feinberg 1980: 126.
41. Mill 1972: 126.
42. Callan 1997; Gutmann 1995.
43. Van Parijs 1999.
44. Schrag 2004.
45. “…children change through the process
of intellectual, emotional, and moral deve-
lopment from being the sort of creatures
whose interests are protected by rights to
being the sort of creatures whose rights pro-
tect their choices”. Brennan 2002: 54.
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bstract: Changes in social policy in
the United States (US) over the past
four decades have provided health
 insurance for 100 percent of persons over age
65 and decreased poverty for this group while
the number of children in poverty has risen and
ten million are uninsured. This increasing
 intergenerational inequity reflects political
 decisions where children lack a voice. The pur-
poses of this paper are to: 1) summarize, from
the fields of ethics, government, law, social wel-
fare and public health, current thinking about
enfranchisement of children; 2) review the
 evolution of voting and representation in the US
and identify misperceptions about barriers to
equitable representation of children; 3)  discuss
the legal basis for children being regarded as
adults and adult proxy decision making for
children; and 4) suggest strategies to stimulate
an equitable system of child representation by
altering our current system of voting.
Analyses of intergenerational inequity:
the case for proxy voting
The status of children in the US reflects how
they are regarded in the American political
system. Every child born in the US is a
 citizen and granted equal protection under
the law by the 14th Amendment to the US
Constitution. Each child is also counted for
apportioning representatives to the US
House of Representatives as declared in the
Constitution. Therefore the 75 million chil-
dren under the age of 18, representing about
25 percent of the population, should have
considerable influence in how policy is made
in Congress. However, due to disenfranchise -
ment, children’s issues are no match for the
political agendas of groups with voting
power.
Peterson was one of the first to analyze the
consequences of children’s disenfranchise-
ment.2 Using data from 1959 to 1990 he
documented the steady fall in poverty
among the elderly from 35 percent to 11
percent while the poverty rate in children
 increased from 14 percent to 21 percent. He
anticipated that if children were given the
right to vote, substantial changes in health
care, funding of public schools, and policies
addressing retirement pensions would result.
He concluded, “Benefits to children would
become a matter of right rather than a
 public benefaction”.3
Paralleling the discrepancy in poverty is the
inequity in healthcare. The upcoming
(2010) budget for Medicare, which provides
health insurance for all individuals over age
65, is 453 billion dollars. In contrast, the
 national initiative for insuring low-income
children has been funded at five billion
 dollars annually since 1997 with funding for
2010 scheduled to be increased to ten  billion
dollars. This budget, less than 20 percent of
the amount Medicare spends on prescription
drugs, was considered a major accomplish-
ment with passage of the Child Health
 Insurance Reauthorization Act of 2009, yet
there are still ten million children who will
be uninsured due to the disparity that
 characterizes healthcare funding.
Newacheck highlighted the shift in spending
toward the elderly that occurred within the
last generation.4 In response to the high
 poverty rate in the elderly in 1965 there was
a rise in the percent of all social welfare
 expenditures allocated to the elderly from 21
percent to 33 percent by 1986. However
there was a simultaneous decrease in chil-
dren’s share of social welfare spending from
37 percent to 25 percent. Between 1980 and
2000, the gap between the funding of pro-
grams for the elderly compared with chil-
dren’s programs increased by 20 percent. He
clearly articulates the basis for the inequity:
“democracy does not always yield fair results,
especially when important segments of the
population are disenfranchised from the
 voting process”.5
Newacheck proposes the federal government
guarantee children a minimum benefit level
to parallel the support oﬀered to the elderly.
While recognizing this would  require an in-
crease in taxes to more closely reflect the Eu-
ropean Union he believes “the country can
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Children, after all, are not just adults-
in-the-making. They are people
whose current needs and rights and
experiences must be taken seriously.
/ Alfie Kohn /
New Release
The Institute of Development Studies has devoted issue
13 (november) 2009 of its "Policy Briefing" to the
topic: Climate Change, Child Rights and Intergenera-
tional Justice. 
From the cover: "The response to climate change will
profoundly aﬀect the quality of life of future generati-
ons of children, yet this intergenerational aspect has yet
to be placed at the heart of climate change discussions.
A child rights approach to climate change would take
the concerns of intergenerational justice into account
and radically transform the policies and commitments
of those in power."
More information: www.ids.ac.uk
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